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HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF ART.

Translated from the second volume of HEGEL'S *ÆSTHETICS*, by Miss S. A. LONGWELL.

CHIVALRY.—II. *Love*.

The second sentiment that plays a dominant part in the representations of romantic art is love.

(*a*) If the fundamental character of honor is the personal subjectivity as it manifests itself in its absolute independence, the highest degree of love, on the contrary, is self-forgetfulness, the identification of the subject with an individual of the other sex. It is the yielding of its independent consciousness, its particular-individuality, which is for the first time compelled to have its self-knowledge in the consciousness of another. In this respect, love and honor are opposed to each other. But conversely we can regard love as the realization of a principle which already exists in honor, in so far as it is the necessity of honor to see the infinitude of person which he assumes recognized by another. This recognition is first genuine and total, when not only my personality in the abstract, or in a concrete, particular, and therefore limited sense, is honored by others, but when I, entirely, with all that I am and comprehend in myself, as I have been, am, and shall be, pervade the consciousness of another, constitute its real will, thought, tendency, and most intimate possession. Then this other lives only in me, as I live only in him. Each becomes in this complementary unity first for himself, and they place their whole world and soul in this identity. In this respect there is the same intrinsic infinity of the subject which gives to love its importance in romantic art, an importance which is still enhanced through the higher wealth that the idea of love comprehends.

Love does not depend upon reflection and the casuistry of the understanding, as may often be the case with honor, but finds its origin in emotion, and has at the same time, where sex is concerned, the foundation of spiritualized natural relations. However, this difference is essential only because the individual puts into this union his soul, the spiritual and infinite element of his being. This renouncing of self in order

to be identified with another—this devotion, this disinterestedness, in which the subject finds again the plenitude of his being—this self-forgetfulness, so that the lover exists not, cares not for himself, but finds the sources of his being in another,—constitute the infinite character of love. And its chief beauty is that it does not remain mere impulse and feeling; but imagination, under the charm of love, creates its own world, makes all else, that otherwise pertains to interest, surroundings, purposes of the actual life and being, an ornament of this feeling, draws all into this circle, and only in reference to this assigns to anything a value.

Particularly in feminine characters is love most beautiful, since this sacrificing, this disinterestedness, is carried by them to its highest degree. They conform the whole intellectual and moral life to this emotion, find in it alone an anchor to existence, and, if deprived of love by adversity, vanish as a light that is extinguished at the first rough breath.

In this subjective fervor of emotion, love does not appear in classic art, and generally it only makes its appearance as a kind of manifestation of subordinate moment, or only by the side of sensuous enjoyment. In Homer either no great stress is placed upon love, or it appears in its most worthy form in domestic life, as, for example, the conjugal fidelity of Penelope, or, as the tender solicitude of the wife and mother, in Andromache, or otherwise in moral relations. On the contrary, the tie that unites Paris and Helen is acknowledged as immoral—it is the cause of the horrors and necessity of the Trojan war; and the love of Achilles for Briseis has little internality and depth of emotion, for Briseis is a slave, submissive to the hero's will. In the Odes of Sappho, the language of love rises indeed to lyric enthusiasm, yet it is rather the expression of a flame which consumes, than that of a sentiment which penetrates to the depths of the heart and fills the soul. Love appears in another phase in the graceful little songs of Anacreon. It is a more serene, more general pleasure, which knows neither infinite sorrows, nor the absorption of the entire existence in a single sentiment, nor the submission of an oppressed and languishing soul. It partakes freely of immediate pleasure without attaching to the exclusive possession of precisely this person and no other—

a demand which is as foreign to its thought as the monastic resolution entirely to ignore the relation of sex.

The high Tragedy of the Ancients, likewise, does not know the passion of love in its romantic meaning. Especially in Æschylus and Sophocles it claims no real interest. For although Antigone is the destined wife of Hæmon, and he, unable to save his beloved, destroys himself for her sake, yet he manifests before Creon only objective relations, and not the subjective power of his passion, which he does not even experience in the acceptance of an ardent modern lover. Euripides treats love as a more real pathos—in Phædra, for example ; yet even here it appears as a criminal aberration, caused by ardor of blood and by a troubled mind, as incited by Venus, who wishes to destroy Hyppolytus because this young prince refuses to sacrifice upon her altars. So we have indeed in the Venus di Medici a plastic representation of love which leaves nothing to be desired, in delicacy and perfection of form, but the expression of the subjective. Such as romantic art demands is entirely lacking. The same is true in Roman poetry. After the destruction of the republic, and in the accompanying laxity of morals, love appears more or less as a sensuous pleasure. In the Middle Ages, on the contrary, although Petrarch, for example, regarded his sonnets as trifles, and based his reputation upon his Latin poems and works, yet he immortalized himself by this ideal love, which under the Italian heaven is united in an ardent imagination with the religious sentiment. The sublime inspiration of Dante also had its source in his love for Beatrice. This love appeared in him as a religious love, while his energy and boldness attained the energy of a religious artistic intuition, through which he dared that which no one before him had ventured, namely, to exalt himself as supreme judge of the world, and to assign men to Hell, to Purgatory, and to Heaven. As a contrast to this exaltation, Boccaccio represents love, in its vivacity of passion, frivolous, without morality ; while he brings before our eyes, in his various tales, the customs of his time and country. In the German Minnesingers love appears sentimental, tender without copiousness of imagination, playful, melancholy, and monotonous. With the Spaniards it is imaginative in expression, chivalric, subtle sometimes

in seeking and defending its rights and duties, of which it makes so many points of personal honor; it is also enthusiastic when displayed in its highest brilliancy. Among the modern French it becomes, on the contrary, more gallant, inclined to frivolity, a sentiment created for poetry. Sometimes it is pleasure without passion, sometimes passion without pleasure, a sublimated entirely reflexive sentiment and susceptibility.

(b) The world and real life are full of conflicting interests. On one side stands society with its actual organization, domestic life, civil and political relations, law, justice, customs, etc.; and in opposition to this positive reality rises love, a passion which germinates in noble, ardent souls, which now unites itself with religion, now subordinates it, forgets it even, and, regarding itself alone the essential, indeed the only or highest necessity of life, is able not only to determine to renounce all else and to flee with the beloved into a wilderness, but may besides deliver itself to all excesses, even to the renouncing of human dignity. This opposition cannot fail to occasion numerous collisions, for the other interests of life also make valid their demands and rights, and thereby affect love in its pretensions to supremacy.

(1) The first and most frequent collision which we have to mention, is the conflict between love and honor. Honor has in itself the same infinity as love, and may assume a significance that is an absolute hindrance in the way of love. The duty of honor may demand the sacrifice of love? In a certain class of society, for example, it would be incompatible with honor to love a woman of inferior rank. The difference in rank is the necessary result of the nature of things; and, besides, it is admitted. Now, since secular life is not yet renewed through the complete conception of true freedom, in which position, vocation, etc., of the subject, as such, disappear, so it is always more or less birth which assigns to man his rank and position; and these conditions are still regarded as absolute and eternal by, although not through, honor, in so far as it makes its own position an affair of honor.

(2) But secondly, besides honor, the permanent substantial powers themselves, state interests, patriotism, domestic duties, etc., may also conflict with love and forbid its realiza-

tion. Especially in modern representations, in which the objective relations of life have already attained complete validity, is this a very popular theme. Love then appears as a powerful right of the subjective nature, so opposed to the other rights and duties that the heart itself banishes these duties as subordinate, or acknowledges them, and comes into conflict with itself and the power of its own passion. The Maid of Orleans, for example, rests upon this last collision.

(3) Yet, thirdly, there may exist in general external relations and impediments which oppose themselves to love: the general course of events, the prose of life, misfortunes, passion, prejudice, wilfulness of others, and events of various kinds. Consequently much hatred is often involved, because the perversity, the crudeness, the wild fierceness of foreign passions, are placed in opposition to the tender beauty of love. Particularly in recent Dramas, Tales, and Romances, we often see the same external collisions. They interest chiefly through our sympathy with the sufferings, hopes and disappointments of the unhappy lovers. The conclusion, according as it is happy or unhappy, satisfies or moves us. Sometimes these productions simply entertain us. This kind of conflict however, which depends upon mere contingency, is of a subordinate nature.

(c) Love presents in all these respects, it is true, an elevated character in so far as it remains in general not only an affection of the sexes for each other, but manifests in itself a rich, beautiful, noble nature; and is, in its unity with others, living, active, brave, self-sacrificing. But romantic love has likewise its limits; namely, there is wanting in its comprehension the general and universal. It is only the personal sense of the individual subject that shows itself satisfied, not with permanent interests and the objective value of human existence—with the well-being of the family, of the state, and of native land—with professional duties, freedom, and religion,—but aspires only to find itself reflected in another, and to have its passion shared. This comprehension corresponds neither to its formal ardor, nor truly to the totality which must be in itself a concrete individuality. In the family, in marriage even, in a moral point of view both public and private, the subjective perception exists as such, and the union

with exactly this and no other individual, may not be the principal thing upon which it depends. But in romantic love all turns upon this principle, the mutual love of two individuals. Indeed, only this or that individual exists who finds his subjective particularity in the contingency of caprice. To every one his beloved appears as to the maiden her lover, always incomparable; each finds the other the supreme type of beauty and perfection. But if it is true that each one makes of the beloved a Venus or something more, it happens that there are many who pass as the same, for, as indeed all know, there are in the world many excellent maidens, pretty or good, who all, or at least the majority, find their admirers, lovers, and husbands, to whom they appear beautiful, virtuous, and lovely. Only this exclusive and absolute preference is purely an affair of the heart, an entirely personal choice; and the unlimited pertinacity indispensable in finding in just this one his life and his highest consciousness, proves itself the eternal choice of necessity. There is recognized in this manifestation the higher freedom of the subjectivity and its abstract choice—freedom, not merely, as the Phædra of Euripides, for pathos, but concerning the absolutely individual will from which it proceeds; choice seems, at the same time, a caprice and stubbornness of the particular individual.

Therefore collisions with love retain ever a phase of contingency and authorized wantonness, especially when love conflicts with substantial interests; because it is the subjectivity as such which opposes its demands, in and for themselves invalid, to that which must make the claim to its own reality dependent upon recognition. The personages in the high Tragedies of the Ancients, Agamemnon, Clytemnestra, Orestes, Œdipus, Antigone, Creon, etc., have likewise, it is true, an individual purpose; but the reality, the pathos, that was the motive of their acts is of absolute authority, and precisely on that account in itself also of general interest. The destiny that befalls them as the result of their acts does not affect us because there is an unhappy destiny, but because there is an unhappy being that at the same time loves absolutely; while pathos, which affects not until it has obtained satisfaction, has a necessary significance. If the

guilt of Clytemnestra is not punished in this particular case, if the wrong which Antigone as sister experienced is not redressed, then there is in itself a wrong. But these sufferings of love, these heart-rending hopes, this being in love, these infinite anxieties which a lover experiences, this eternal felicity and blessedness that he imagines, are not in themselves of general interest, but pertain only to himself.

Every man indeed has a heart for love and the right to find happiness in loving; but there is no injustice done if he exactly in this case, among these and those circumstances, in respect to precisely this maiden, does not attain his aim. For there is no necessity that he interest himself in this capricious maiden, and that we should be interested in an affair so accidental which has neither extension nor universality. This is a phase of coldness that manifests itself in the development of this ardent passion.

HEGEL AS PUBLICIST.

Translated from the German of Dr. K. ROSENKRANZ, by G. S. HALL.

When compendiums are printed, their style is usually meagre and skeleton-like; the paragraphs of the Hegelian Encyclopedia, on the contrary, preserve for us a lively, didactic prose, in the intensive fullness of which it is throughout felt that a high geniality has imposed such a limitation upon itself with freedom. Behind these well-weighed words, the rich spirit may be conjectured which is able to broaden each into an entire world of meaning and to defend each in its own peculiar significance.

The Heidelberg professors had made the "Heidelberg Year-book" a critical organ, which, at the time of Hegel's sojourn there, was at the acme of its highest prosperity. At first it represented the stand-point of Romanticism, which at the time of the French dominion had a national patriotic significance. Daub, Creuzer, and Goerres, who had previously been united in the editorship of the "Studien," exercised at first the greatest influence upon it. At the time of Hegel, Paulus had as-